Authored by Anthony Watts via WattsUpWithThat.com,

In November 2006, when I launched Watts Up With That?, the idea was simple enough: look at the data, check the instruments, and ask whether the conclusions being drawn actually followed from the evidence. It was never intended as a career in heresy. It was, at the time, a fairly normal scientific impulse steeped in curiosity.

Nearly twenty years later, that impulse requires a helmet.

As WUWT approaches its twentieth anniversary in 2026, it’s worth reflecting on how climate change went from being a hypothesis—one among many competing explanations for observed changes—to a full-fledged belief system, complete with sacred texts (IPCC reports), approved language, and the occasional excommunication.

The climate, meanwhile, has been far less dramatic.

2006–2008: When Thermometers Were Still Just Thermometers

Back in the mid-2000s, climate science still resembled…well, science. There were disagreements. There were debates. People argued about cloud feedbacks, solar influences, ocean cycles, and the reliability of historical temperature records without being accused of crimes against humanity.

Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth arrived in 2006 like a traveling roadshow of impending doom. Polar bears were stranded, seas were rising, and hurricanes were apparently lining up in formation. It was slick, emotional, and heavy on graphs that only went in one direction.

At the same time, a curious thing was happening on the ground. Actual thermometers—those stubbornly analog devices—were being placed next to heat sources, asphalt, and buildings. So WUWT did something radical: we took pictures.

This turned out to be surprisingly controversial, heretical even.

Apparently, photographing a thermometer next to an air conditioning exhaust was not “constructive engagement.” Who knew?

2009: Climategate—The Sound of Trust Hitting the Floor

Then came Climategate.

The emails were not hacked in the Hollywood sense; they were released, read, and promptly explained away. What they showed was not a grand conspiracy, but something far more human: groupthink, defensiveness, and an alarming willingness to manage perception instead of data.

“Hide the decline” entered the public lexicon, and suddenly climate scientists were explaining that it didn’t mean what it sounded like it meant. Which, coincidentally, is almost never a good sign.

For a brief moment, it looked like climate science might undergo a badly needed course correction. Transparency! Open data! Robust debate!

Instead, we got faux inquiries that investigated themselves and found themselves innocent.

Lesson learned: the problem was not the behavior—it was that outsiders noticed.

2010–2014: The Pause That Wasn’t There (Until It Was)

The next few years delivered an unexpected plot twist: the planet declined to follow the script.

Global temperatures flattened. Models predicted steady warming; observations did not comply. This became known as the “pause,” then the “hiatus,” then—after enough editorials—the “thing that never happened and you’re not allowed to mention.”

This was a golden age for climate creativity. Heat was hiding in the deep oceans, where it could not be measured but could still be blamed. Aerosols became the Swiss Army knife of explanations. Data adjustments proliferated.

When observations disagreed with models, the models were not questioned. The observations were “corrected.”

It was around this time that many of us realized the hierarchy had flipped. Models were now reality. Reality was negotiable.

2015: Paris—Promises, Promises

The Paris Agreement was hailed as a turning point. World leaders gathered to save the planet using pledges that were voluntary, unenforceable, and carefully worded to sound impressive while committing to very little.

It was a triumph of political theater.

No one asked how intermittent energy would power industrial societies. No one discussed grid stability. No one mentioned energy poverty. Those details were, apparently, unhelpful.

From this point on, climate policy became less about outcomes and more about optics. If emissions went up, the solution was more ambition. If costs rose, the solution was more commitment. Failure was proof that we simply hadn’t believed hard enough.

2018–2019: The Emergency Button Gets Stuck

Somewhere around 2018, the word “emergency” became mandatory.

We were told we had twelve years to save the planet. Then ten. Then five. The deadline kept moving, but always closer—like a cosmic treadmill.

Children were encouraged to panic. Adults were scolded for driving cars. Weather was promoted from background noise to moral indictment.

A heatwave? Climate change.
A flood? Climate change.
A cold snap? Climate change “disrupting the jet stream.”

Heads I win, tails you deny science.

2020–2022: When Everything Was an Emergency

The pandemic years revealed just how easily societies could be governed by emergency decree. Climate activism took careful notes.

Lockdowns briefly reduced emissions, proving once and for all that modern civilization could, in fact, be shut down—at great human cost—for minimal climatic benefit.

Energy policies, however, continued unabated. Reliable baseload was dismantled. Wind and solar were celebrated for theoretical capacity rather than actual performance.

When grids faltered and prices soared, we were told this was further proof of the need to double down.

It was around this time that “trust the science” quietly came to mean “do not ask questions.”

2023–2026: The Era of Unquestionable Certainty

Now, at the twenty-year mark, the climate narrative is polished, institutionalized, and remarkably immune to evidence.

Sea level rise continues at rates best appreciated with tide gauges and patience. Extreme weather remains stubbornly inconsistent with apocalyptic claims. Crop yields rise. Human adaptability refuses to cooperate with disaster models.

But none of that matters much anymore.

The climate scare no longer depends on predictions coming true—only on maintaining urgency. Models still overestimate warming, but the solution is always the same: adjust, attribute, and assert.

Dissent is not debated; it is diagnosed.

Twenty Years Later

After two decades of watching this unfold, I’ve learned that the most remarkable thing about the climate scare is not how much the climate has changed—but how much the rules of discussion have.

In 2006, skepticism was part of science.
In 2016, it is treated as a character flaw.
In 2026, it seems like people might be listening to us.

WUWT has endured because it kept doing the unfashionable thing: looking at the data, pointing out inconsistencies, and occasionally raising an eyebrow when the emperor’s new model ran a little warm.

The climate will continue to change. It always has. The real question is whether society can rediscover the value of skepticism before policy built on perpetual emergency does lasting damage.

And if not—well, at least the models will still be very confident. /sarc

By the way, if you’ve not seen it yet, check out our newly updated Failed Climate Predictions Timeline.

Tuesday’s major Ukraine summit of the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ in Paris on Tuesday, where dozens of European leaders were hosted by President Emmanuel Macron, is still desperately trying to salvage strong security guarantees for Kiev as a central part of any future peace deal to end the war with Russia.

Macron vowed that Ukraine’s allies and military backers would “make concrete commitments” at the meeting “to protect Ukraine and ensure a just and lasting peace.” The Kremlin is going to see this as yet another exercise in flirting with Russia’s red lines – especially the idea of NATO ‘Article 5-style’ security guarantees.

via BBC

Reportedly the United States has already agreed to lead a “ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism” with European participation assuming a deal can be reached – based on a draft statement seen by the AFP.

Washington is also said to b  willing “support” a European-led multinational force, which would necessitate American boots on the ground “in case” of any new future attack by Russia post-truce deal.

But one never really knows when it comes to President Trump – or what he’s ultimately willing to finally sign on to, also at a moment of ongoing friction with the Zelensky government.

It must be recalled that he and his admin officials have been quite vocal time and again about never committing American troops to Ukraine in the context of a fight with nuclear-armed Russia.

Trump himself has been strident on this point, going back even to the early campaign trail. Will he flip? The White House, if it does sign onto this fundamentally European plan or an alteration to the 20-points, is more likely to spin this as “not actually boots on the ground” to satisfy skeptics among the MAGA base.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and American envoys are there in Paris, along with what’s said to be an unprecedented amount of other heads of state and defense officials. 

🚨 Who is meeting in Paris today: A total of 40 representatives from different countries and international organizations.

28 country leaders, including Ukraine, will attend, along with leaders of 4 international organizations: the European Council, the European Commission,… pic.twitter.com/aLPH0eySBQ

— Kateryna Lisunova (@KaterynaLis) January 6, 2026

Reading the room, this meeting seems much more about Europe taking the reins of the peace deal away from Washington. Just look at the rhetoric… which Moscow will simply receive as dead on arrival:

Downing street has said that Britain will “deploy forces to Ukraine in event of a peace deal.” In a statement released after Starmer signed the “declaration of intent” earlier, his office says:

This is a declaration of intent to deploy forces to Ukraine in event of a peace deal. This is a vital part of our iron cast commitment to stand with Ukraine for the long term.

The ‘Multinational Force for Ukraine’ will act as a reassurance force to bolster security guarantees and Ukraine’s ability to return to peace and stability by supporting the regeneration of Ukraine’s own forces.

The signing of the declaration paves the way for the legal framework to be established for French and UK forces to operate on Ukrainian soil, securing Ukraine’s skies and seas and building an armed forces fit for the future.

In today’s discussions we have also gone into greater detail about the mechanics of the deployment of the force on the ground.

Alongside our plans for a coordination cell, post-ceasefire the UK and France will also establish ‘military hubs’ across Ukraine to enable the deployment and build protected facilities for weapons and military equipment to support Ukraine’s defensive needs.”

Starmer further said, “Putin is not willing to show peace. We will keep the pressure up on Russia, including further measures on oil trades and shadow fleet operators supporting Russia.” And of course this was seconded by all present.

Some interesting long lost faces popped up in Paris…

After all the corruption-related turmoil and reshuffles inside Zelensky’s government, Rada majority leader David Arakhamia surfaces at the meeting of the pro-Ukraine coalition in Paris.

Formerly Ukraine’s top Instanbul negotiator and reputedly a moderate, Arakhamia is known for… pic.twitter.com/9rNm8uj8XQ

— Leonid Ragozin (@leonidragozin) January 6, 2026

Meanwhile President Putin is not going to care about the “mechanics” or technical aspects of what such a deployment would look like. He will see it as but a recipe for what his forces have been fighting against all along: NATO soldiers and infrastructure right along border of the Russian Federation… potentially provoking events which could easily lead to WW3.

Authored by Michael Tomlinson via The Brownstone Institute,

Evidence continues to mount indicating that the global response to the Covid-19 pandemic was counterproductive and harmful, yet mainstream opinion continues to proclaim that it was a triumph.

This is based on scientific papers that often manipulate the data or present it selectively.

Exhibit 1: Cohort study of cardiovascular safety of different Covid-19 vaccination doses among 46 million adults in England by Ip et al. The authors conclude that ‘the incidence of common arterial thrombotic events (mainly acute myocardial infarction and ischaemic stroke) was generally lower after each vaccine dose, brand and combination’ and ‘the incidence of common venous thrombotic events (mainly pulmonary embolism and lower limb deep venous thrombosis) was lower after vaccination.’ 

This seems to be a straightforward outcome, based on a most inclusive sample – the whole population of England. However, Table 2 shows incidence rates of cardiovascular events were substantially higher (nearly double for arterial events) after the first dose of the Pfizer and AstraZeneca vaccines, compared to no vaccination:

This contradicts the text: ‘The incidence of thrombotic and cardiovascular complications was generally lower after each dose of each vaccine brand.’ Of course, ‘generally’ is a weasel word. It means that the incidence of complications after each dose was lower except where it was higher. Incidence rates for the Moderna vaccine were indeed much lower at least in the medium term (up to 26 weeks) but rates for AstraZeneca and Pfizer were much higher.

Incidence rates after the second dose were indeed ‘generally’ lower in the tables. But Supplementary Table 3 reveals that the definition of ‘no vaccination’ for Dose 2 in fact means the interval between a first dose and a second dose. The largest increases in incidence rates are for the Pfizer and AstraZeneca Dose 1 vaccination groups, the only cohorts compared with a true vaccination naïve control group.

Supplementary Table 4 shows substantial increases in incidence rates for Dose 1 broken down for all eleven cardiac events measured (and two composites).

Returning to Table 2, the vaccinated group and the unvaccinated groups have comparable numbers of events, but the vaccinated groups are calculated with reference to approximately half the number of person years. If we apply the incidence rates to the numbers of people in each group (at the top of Table 1), we can calculate vaccination with the AstraZeneca and Pfizer vaccines brought about in the region of 91,000 additional serious cardiac events (euphemistically described as ‘complications’) compared to the no vaccination group in a little over one year. On the other hand, the Moderna group experienced over 34,000 fewer events compared with the no vaccination group, leading to an overall balance of around 56,000 additional events. How many of the individuals who had additional heart attacks, strokes, and thromboses subsequently died? The results are shocking, but after further processing we are told they are ‘reassuring.’

To obscure the alarming results, the text relies not on the straight incidence rates but on hazard ratios ‘adjusting for a wide range of potential confounding factors.’

It is not apparent why any adjustment was necessary. On the one hand, ‘There were few differences between subgroups defined by demographic and clinical characteristics,’ and on the other hand, ‘we addressed potential confounding by adjusting for a wide range of demographic factors and prior diagnoses.’ Were there significant differences in demographics or weren’t there? 

Further on, we are told that ‘Subgroup analyses by age group, ethnic group, previous history of the event of interest and sex were conducted’ and outcomes ‘were generally similar across subgroups.’ What were the potentially confounding factors that had to be adjusted for if not these? How could an incidence rate of approximately 1.9 for the Pfizer Dose 1 arterial events be adjusted to a hazard ratio of 0.9? 

If an adjustment leads to the reversal of findings of this magnitude, then it must be done transparently and with full substantiation. Without further explanation, the adjustment seems extraordinary and unjustifiable if outcomes were similar across subgroups and no differentiating factor is identified. They are statistical artefacts of low credibility and should not be used to guide policy. 

This is a well-established academic trope – something that seems on the face of it to be black is not really black, but when ‘adjusted’ in an undisclosed and untransparent way has many white characteristics. 

Table 2 compares the ‘primary course’ rates with the ‘after booster vaccination’ rates, where the Pfizer incidence rates are again higher for this last dose in the series, compounding the primary dose increase. I would have thought the authors should have commented on this, given that it contradicts the conclusions of the paper. This rise in the rate for vaccinated individuals with subsequent vaccinations is unlikely to be and is not in fact explained by confounding factors. We are told that both second dose-vaccinated and booster-vaccinated cohorts were older than the first dose cohort, so age does not seem to explain the rise. Other confounding factors are not revealed. Did they exist for any of the cohorts? 

The authors also resort to breaking the data down into slices (dose by dose) in a way which prioritises the micro over the macro perspective, and obscures strategic synthesis. 

After three doses (including boosters), how did the incidence rates of the vaccinated groups compare with that of the unvaccinated groups in toto, over the whole study period? Were they higher or lower overall? This is not revealed. What about after a year? Two years? Three years? Why are the Moderna rates so much lower, and why do they not discuss this? On the basis of the figures in the table, repeated doses of the Pfizer and AstraZeneca vaccines pose unacceptable risks. Yet these were the main vaccines deployed in England in this period, approximately 90% of the total.

But on the basis of these misleading and selected statistics, unasked and unanswered questions, the authors triumphantly conclude:

These findings, in conjunction with the long-term higher risk of severe cardiovascular and other complications associated with COVID-19, offer compelling evidence supporting the net cardiovascular benefit of COVID vaccination.

This is a whitewash. Their unadjusted data show the reverse – most Covid-19 vaccinations increased cardiac risks. The fact that the authors studiously refrain from referring to or discussing the markedly adverse incidence ratios after vaccination is strongly indicative of bias, although at least they included them in the tables, taking a risk that close readers might notice their significance.

Many other studies perpetuate the whitewash, based on a zero-sum assumption that there are two mutually exclusive groups: unvaccinated people who fall victim to Covid-19 and vaccinated people who don’t.But the Cleveland Clinic preprint by Shrestha et al found that:

Consistent with similar findings in many prior studies…a higher number of prior vaccine doses was associated with a higher risk of COVID-19. The exact reason for this finding is not clear. It is possible that this may be related to the fact that vaccine-induced immunity is weaker and less durable than natural immunity….Thus, the short-term protection provided by a COVID-19 vaccine comes with a risk of increased susceptibility to COVID-19 in the future.

They reached the same conclusion in their peer-reviewed report on the effectiveness of the 2019 bivalent vaccines: ‘The risk of Covid-19 also increased with time since the most recent prior Covid-19 episode and with the number of vaccine doses previously received.’

Studies which show that vaccinated groups have much lower rates of infection than unvaccinated groups are usually founded on the ‘case-counting window bias,’ as explained in the peer-reviewed report on the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna by Alessandria et al. The vaccinated have lower numbers of infections in a defined window of time, but not necessarily beyond it. By contrast, the Cleveland Clinic studies above use a longer and additive timeframe, and Ip et al do not seem to exclude the first 14 days, which is a strength of their base statistics.

There is the risk that both the vaccines and the virus might cause similar harms to the cardiovascular system. Jean Marc Sabatier of Aix-Marseilles University has been warning against this from early in the pandemic. In 2021 he and his colleagues published a peer-reviewed paper: The Renin-Angiotensin System: A Key Role in SARS-CoV-2-Induced COVID-19.

The paper explains:

In fact, the viral entrance promotes a downregulation of ACE2 followed by RAS balance dysregulation and an overactivation of the angiotensin II (Ang II)–angiotensin II type I receptor (AT1R) axis, which is characterized by a strong vasoconstriction and the induction of the profibrotic, proapoptotic and proinflammatory signalizations in the lungs and other organs. This mechanism features a massive cytokine storm, hypercoagulation, an acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) and subsequent multiple organ damage.

The model is depicted in Figure 1:

While the paper focuses almost entirely on Covid-19, the disease, the implications of the model go to risks of the vaccine also. This is cautiously slipped into the explication of Figure 1 (my italics): ‘during SARS-CoV-2 infection or upon receiving a spike protein-based vaccine, the viral Spike (S) glycoprotein binding to ACE2 receptor induces overactivation of the ACE/Ang II/AT1R axis.’

So, we must consider the risk that as well as the SARS-CoV-2 virus, some (if not all) vaccines might also induce overactivation of the ACE2 receptor and consequently the renin angiotensin system. There is no proof that they do, but there is equally no proof that they do not, and the model fits well with the Ip data on cardiovascular event incidence levels for the Pfizer and AstraZeneca vaccines (but not with the favourable Moderna figures – what is different about the Moderna vaccine?). 

This would be an issue under any scenario, but even more so if incidence of Covid-19 increases with the number of vaccine doses previously received. The vaccinated can be repeatedly challenged by the spike protein both in the form of the virus and in the form of the vaccines as well. The risks from infection are not obviated – the risks of vaccinations are added to them, not substituted for them.

There has been a torrent of papers on the effects of Covid-19 vaccination, focusing on these limited windows of effectiveness. They display strong confirmation bias – data and findings apparently supporting effectiveness are welcomed with open arms despite obvious flaws, findings that overtly cast doubt on effectiveness or safety are vigorously contested and often succumb to a campaign to have them retracted. If the data are unfavourable, better to ‘adjust’ them so you can reverse the conclusions. This constitutes scientific misinformation.

Although pro-vaccine papers sometimes have sophisticated technical values, they show little capability for strategic thinking.

Which is the preferable and lowest-risk strategy over the timeframe of the pandemic crisis:

Undergoing multiple vaccinations of short-term effectiveness

Minimizing exposure to the spike vaccine?

The scientific literature simply does not test this strategic comparison by comparing overall outcomes for the vaccinated from the point of vaccination to the end of the pandemic crisis period, compared with the truly unvaccinated. But what we do know from the Ip population-level study of England is that Dose 1 for the two most commonly used vaccines increased 11 out of 11 cardiac events and a booster increased both arterial and venous events again for the Pfizer vaccine. 

Individuals should be free to make the strategic choice, guided by their health professionals, and should not be coerced to follow the first strategy through mandates. Mandates should not risk creating severe adverse outcomes on a mass scale.

The Middle East is home to some of the world’s fastest-growing and most densely populated cities. Rapid population growth, rural-to-urban migration, and economic concentration have driven major cities to expand well beyond their historic cores.

This map, via Visual Capitalist’s Niccolo Conte, highlights the most populated cities in the region in 2025.

The data for this visualization comes from the United Nations.

Cairo Stands Alone at the Top

Cairo ranks as the Middle East’s most populated city, with more than 25.5 million residents in 2025. The Egyptian capital has expanded steadily for decades, driven by high birth rates and sustained migration from rural areas. Alexandria and several other Egyptian cities also rank highly.

Rank
Location
City
2025 population
1
🇪🇬 Egypt
Al-Qahirah (Cairo)
25,566,000
2
🇹🇷 Türkiye
Istanbul
15,015,000
3
🇮🇷 Iran
Tehrān (Tehran)
9,175,000
4
🇪🇬 Egypt
Alexandria
7,267,000
5
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia
Ar-Riyāḑ (Riyadh)
6,916,000
6
🇯🇴 Jordan
Ammān (Amman)
6,404,000
7
🇮🇶 Iraq
Baghdād (Baghdad)
6,391,000
8
🇮🇷 Iran
Mashhad
5,398,000
9
🇦🇪 United Arab Emirates
Dubai
5,284,000
10
🇸🇾 Syria
Dimashq (Damascus)
4,288,000
11
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia
Jeddah
4,284,000
12
🇰🇼 Kuwait
Al Kuwayt (Kuwait City)
4,265,000
13
🇪🇬 Egypt
Luxor
4,188,000
14
🇾🇪 Yemen
Şan’ā’ (Sana’a)
4,019,000
15
🇹🇷 Türkiye
Ankara
3,612,000
16
🇮🇷 Iran
Karaj
3,599,000
17
🇸🇾 Syria
Aleppo
2,922,000
18
🇹🇷 Türkiye
Izmir
2,650,000
19
🇮🇱 Israel
Tel Aviv
2,643,000
20
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia
Dammam
2,336,000
21
🇹🇷 Türkiye
Bursa
2,282,000
22
🇶🇦 Qatar
Ad-Dawhah (Doha)
2,194,000
23
🇪🇬 Egypt
Banha
2,089,000
24
🇮🇶 Iraq
Basra
2,034,000
25
🇮🇷 Iran
Isfahan
1,844,000
26
🇱🇧 Lebanon
Bayrūt (Beirut)
1,794,000
27
🇪🇬 Egypt
El Mansura
1,713,000
28
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia
Mecca
1,692,000
29
🇮🇶 Iraq
Mosul
1,665,000
30
🇮🇷 Iran
Ahwaz
1,639,000

Türkiye and Iran Anchor Urban Growth

Türkiye places multiple cities in the top 20, led by Istanbul with over 15 million people, followed by Ankara and Izmir.

Iran also features prominently, with Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, and several secondary cities reflecting the country’s large population and relatively balanced urban network.

Gulf Cities Punch Above Their Weight

Several Gulf cities appear high on the list despite much smaller national populations. Riyadh, Dubai, Jeddah, Doha, and Kuwait City have grown rapidly over the past two decades, fueled by economic diversification, infrastructure investment, and foreign labor inflows.

While smaller than Cairo or Istanbul, their growth rates remain among the fastest in the region.

If you enjoyed today’s post, check out The World’s Wealthiest Nations in 2025 on Voronoi, the new app from Visual Capitalist.