If there is one word that best characterizes President Donald Trump’s Ukraine policy, it’s “frantic.”

If you don’t believe me, take a look at the last several days of drama, when the Trump administration dropped a 28-point peace proposal into the Ukrainians’ lap that included some concessions that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has dismissed as unacceptable. According to the original draft, which was revised over the weekend between senior U.S. and Ukrainian officials to 19 points, Kyiv would be expected to withdraw all of its troops from the areas of the Donbas it currently controls. The Ukrainian army’s end-strength would be capped at 600,000 men. And Ukraine would amend its constitution to ensure it doesn’t join NATO. Purported U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine would be on offer in exchange, but those measures would be ill defined, leaving the Ukrainians wondering whether Washington would really come to its defense in the event of another Russian invasion.

The plan generated significant blowback in Ukraine and Europe and in Washington’s foreign policy circuit. Some analysts compared it to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Adolf Hitler. The Europeans tried to be as polite as possible, stating that Trump’s plan was a good first step. But it was abundantly obvious to those outside the Trump administration that the 28 points were bits of trash made to look like a comprehensive peace agreement to end a war that will reach its fourth year in February.

In the end, the White House changed tact, arguing that the proposal was just a starting point, not a finished product. 

If you’re getting a little dizzy from all these developments, I don’t blame you. The last three days encapsulate Trump’s approach to ending this conflict since he entered office in January. There is no orderly policy process, just a mishmash of half-baked ideas that may or may not gain traction. U.S. policy depends on the last person who has Trump’s ear. Those who monitor U.S. foreign policy are left wondering how long Trump will take before changing his mind again.

During the 2024 presidential campaign, Trump was tough on the Ukrainians. He never really believed the war was America’s business to begin with; he insisted the war would have never happened if he had been president and faulted Zelenskyy for dragging it out unnecessarily. His first meeting with Zelenskyy in February, during which Trump and Vice President JD Vance ambushed him on television and kicked him out of the White House, was a disaster. A week later, U.S. intelligence and weapons assistance to Ukraine was cut, a decision that forced Zelenskyy into participating in the negotiations Trump sought to spark.

Yet the relationship between the two turned around shortly thereafter. In April, Trump and Zelenskyy met at the Vatican and left with a greater understanding of each other’s positions. This summer, Trump invited Zelenskyy and European prime ministers to Washington in what observers at the time described as a show of unity on Ukraine’s behalf. Trump would go on to express his frustration and disappointment with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stalling tactics and authorized more U.S. defense assistance to the Ukrainian army, the precise opposite of his stance months earlier. 

Then came Trump’s August summit with Putin in Alaska. Again, Trump changed his position. Before the meeting, he was demanding the Russians agree to an immediate ceasefire. Yet after the two departed, Trump ditched this ask and suggested that perhaps an immediate ceasefire wasn’t needed to begin the diplomacy. The about-face was bad news for the Ukrainians, who were slowly losing territory in the Donbas to Russia’s ongoing offensive. Trump’s anger with Putin boiled over again in October, exemplified by U.S. sanctions against Russia’s two largest oil companies.  

As evidenced by the events of the last 11 months, to the extent the Trump administration has a policy on Ukraine, it’s disjointed, confusing and often difficult to keep track of. The only consistent theme is Trump’s obsession with striking some historically groundbreaking diplomatic settlement that will terminate Europe’s largest land war in 80 years. Everything else, such as how the United States intends to accomplish the objective, seemingly depends on the day. Ultimatums to one side or the other become subject to further negotiations, and deadlines get waved away as inconsequential.  

Amid this maelstrom, two core items have remained consistent, regardless of how Trump has operated on a daily basis.

Ukraine’s Presidential Office chief of staff Andriy Yermak, second from right, and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio talk to the press as their consultations continue at the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland, on Nov. 23, 2025. (Martial Trezzini/Keystone)

First, in the event a peace settlement is signed, nobody is going to be particularly happy with it. No one is going to get everything they want, and painful concessions, whether it’s on territory, military capacity or the European security architecture, are an inevitability. It oftentimes feels as if the warring parties, as well as their external supporters, genuinely believe there’s a magical agreement available. There isn’t, and we should stop pretending otherwise. Any deal is going to leave people depressed, if not angry. Despite the constant proclamations of getting a so-called “just peace” for Ukraine, a “just peace” is likely impossible.

Second, Europe continues to disappoint. Ultimately what happens in Ukraine is more relevant to Europe’s security than it is to the United States’, but European policymakers are still waiting for the White House to solve the problem for them. Yes, the Europeans are now Ukraine’s biggest military supporters. But in terms of getting a diplomatic outcome, they’re more comfortable complaining about whatever the Trump administration tables than they are proactively putting forth an alternative draft that is actually viable. The only reason the Europeans are involved now is because Trump essentially forced the issue on them.  

The more things change, the more they stay the same. 

Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.

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https://www.chicagotribune.com/2025/11/25/column-donald-trump-ukraine-proposal-depetris/